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Abstract—We consider a scenario where N users send packets
to a common access point. The receiver decodes the message
of each user by treating the other user’s signals as noise.
Associated with each user is its channel state and a finite queue
which varies with time. Each user allocates his power and the
admission control variable dynamically to maximize his expected
throughput. Each user is unaware of the states, and actions taken,
by the other users. This problem is formulated as a Markov game
for which we show the existence of equilibrium and an algorithm
to compute the equilibrium policies. We then show that when the
number of users exceeds a particular threshold, the throughput
of all users at all the equilibria are the same. Furthermore the
equilibrium policies of the users are invariant as long as the
number of users remain above the latter threshold. We also show
that each user can compute these policies using a sequence of
linear programs which does not depend upon the parameters of
the other users. Hence, these policies can be computed by each
user without any information or feedback from the other users.
We then provide numerical results which verify our theoretical
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a tremendous growth of wireless com-
munication systems over the last few years. The success of
wireless systems is primarily due to the efficient use of their
resources. The users are able to obtain their quality of service
efficiently in a time varying radio channel by adjusting their
own transmission powers. Distributed control of resources is
an interesting area of study since its alternative involves high
system complexity and large infrastructure due the presence
of a central controller.
Non cooperative game theory serves as a natural tool to
design and analyze wireless systems with distributed control
of resources [1]. In [2], a distributed resource allocation
problem using game theory on the multiple access channel
(MAC) is considered. They considered the problem where
each user maximizes their own transmission rate in a selfish
manner, while knowing the channel gains of all other users.
Scutari et al. [3] [4] analyzed competitive maximization of
mutual information on the multiple access channel subject to
power constraints. They provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of unique Nash equilibrium. In a similar setup, [5]
showed that for maximizing the effective capacity of each user,
there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Heikkinen [6] analyzed
distributed power control problems via potential games.
In [7], consider a MAC model, where each user knows
only their own channel gain and only the statistics of the
channel gains of other users. The problem is formulated as a
Bayesian game, for which they show the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium. Altman et al. [8] studied the problem of
maximizing throughput of saturated users (a user always has
a packet to transmit) who have a Markov modeled channel and
are subjected to power constraints. They considered both the
centralized scenario where the base station chooses the trans-
mission power levels for all users as well as the decentralized
scenario where each user chooses its own power level based on
the condition of its radio channel. In [9], the authors showed
the convergence of the iterative algorithm proposed in [8].
Altman et al. [10] later considered the problem of maximizing
the throughput of competetive users in a distributed manner
subject to both power and buffer constraints.
The works considered so far, compute equilibrium policies
for games with fixed number of users. As the number of
user increases, the corresponding equilibrium policies of users
change and the complexity of computing these policies also
increases. To overcome these problems, Population games [12]
models the number of users present in the system as being
significantly large, such that each user can be modeled as a
selfish player playing against a continuum of players. Then one
employs techniques such as evolutionary dynamics to compute
the Nash equilibrium policy of a user in this model. Using the
framework of population games, [13] model a mobile cellular
system, where users adjust their base station associations and
dynamically control their transmitter power to adapt to their
time varying radio channels.
Another technique to overcome the latter problems was
developed in [14], [15]. Here each user interacts with other
players only through their average behavior called the mean
field. Note that all the users in these models are considered
to be interchangeable [12], [14], [15]. An application of mean
field modeling in resource allocation was considered in [16],
where each user maximizes their own signal to interference
and noise ratio (SINR). The authors showed this problem as
number of users tends to infinity can be modeled as a Mean
field game.
The authors in [9] consider a different form of analysis
for large number of users. In the model they considered,
they showed that once the number of players in their game
exceed some fixed threshold, the Nash equilibrium policies of
each user gets fixed and can be precomputed in linear time.
The authors refer to such a policy as an Infinitely invariant
Nash equilibrium (IINE) policy. They further showed each
user requires no information or feedback from other users to
compute these policies.
However the saturated model considered in [9] does not
take into account the rate at which data packets arrive form
the higher layer. Hence using polcies which are optimal in
the saturated model may cause arbitarily large queues at the
transmitter. The long delays produced by these policies sig-
nificantly reduce the quality of service of wireless systems.To
mitigate the affect of the latter problem, we consider that
each users has a finite buffer where the incoming packets
are stored before transmission. We also ensure an average
queue constraint on each user. The user then must dynamically
allocate power and control the number of packets arriving at its
buffer to satisfy its average power as well as queue constraints.
Thus unlike the saturated scenario, the user actions affect his
state transitions. We model this problem as a Constrained
Markov decision game with independent state information
[11]. Besides providing a algorithm to compute Nash equilibria
of this game, we also prove the existence of IINE policies.In
the saturated scenario, the IINE was computed using a greedy
algorithm. Here The IINE is computed by solving a finite
number of linear programs(LP), where at each stage, the
current LP requires the solutions of the LP’s of the previous
stages previous stages. The method of proving this result
is different and more general as compared to the saturated
scenario.
Notations: Let gi denote an element of the set Gi of possible
values of a certain parameter associated with the ith user. The
set G =
∏N
i=1 Gi denotes the Cartesian product of these sets.
We represent g = (gi, · · · , gN), g ∈ G as an element of the
set G. The set G−i =
∏N
j=1,j 6=i Gj , denotes the Cartesian
product of the sets other than Gi . Any element of this
set is represented by g−i = (gi, · · · , gi−1, gi+1, · · · , gN),
g−i ∈ G−i. |G| denotes the cardinality of the set G.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We denote n as the time index of the n’th time slot of a dis-
crete time system model. We represent N = {1, 2, 3, · · · , N}
as the set of users sending messages to a common receiver
over a wireless medium. We assume that the fading channel
gain remains constant over each time slot . We represent by
hi[n], the fading channel gain of the ith user in the n
′th
time slot. The channel gain belongs to a finite, non-negative,
ordered set Hi = {h0i , h
1
i , · · · , h
k
i }, where |Hi| = r + 1.
The finite set of discrete channel gains is obtained by the
quantization of the channel state information [8]–[10]. We
assume that the fading channel gain process hi[n] is stationary
and ergodic. The ith user transmits with power pi[n] in the nth
time slot and the value pi[n] belongs to a finite ordered set
Pi = {p0i , p
1
i , · · · , p
l
i}, where |Pi| = q+1. gives The set P is
quantization of the transmit power levels [8], [10]. , The set
Pi includes zero, i.e., p0i = 0, as the user may not transmit any
message in a time slot. At time slot n, user i can transmit up to
qi[n] packets from his finite buffer of size Qi, i.e the value qi
belongs to the set Qi = {q0i , q
1
i , · · · , Qi}. Also at time slot n,
user i receives wi[n] from the higher layer, according to given
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) distribution Fi.
the incoming packets may be accepted or rejected by the user,
which is indicated by the variable ci[n] ∈ {0, 1}, where ci = 1
and ci = 0 indicate acceptance and rejection respectively.
Each user can accept packets until the buffer is full, while the
remaining packets are dropped. We assume that in a given time
slot, all arrivals from the upper layer occur after transmission.
The queue process qi[n] evolves as,
qi[n+ 1] = min([qi[n] + ci[n]wi[n]− 1{pi[n]>0}]
+
, Qi), (1)
where 1E denotes the indicator function of the event E and
x+indicates max(x, 0). The set of states Xi of user i is the
Cartesian product of the set of channel states Hi and the
set of queue states Qi, i.e. Xi := Hi × Qi. The set of
actions of user i Ai is the Cartesian product of the set {0, 1}
and the set of transmit power Pi , i.e. Ai := {0, 1} × Pi.
Any element of these sets Xi and Ai are represented as
xi := (hi, qi) and ai := (ci, pi), ci ∈ {0, 1} respectively.
Each user has an average power and average queue constraints
of Piand Qi respectively. We assume that each user knows
their instantaneous channel gain and queue state but is not
aware of channel gains, queue state and transmit power of
other users. The message of each user is decoded by treating
the signals of the other users as noise. We assume that only
user i and the receiver has complete information about the
number of packets in his buffer and the arrival process wi[n]
of user i is independent of his fading process hi[n]. The reward
function associated with user i when hi,qi and pi are the
instantaneous channel gain, queue state and transmit power
of the ith user, respectively is given by,
ti(x, a) , log2
(
1 +
hipi · 1{qi>0}
N0 +
∑N
j=1,j 6=i hjpj · 1{qj>0}
)
, (2)
where N0 is the receiver noise variance.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Here we define the queue and power allocation policies for
each user. Furthermore we define the time average rewards
and constraints for each user. We then formulate the latter as
a Markov game, and show the existence of Nash equilibria
for the game. Each user utilizes a stationary policy zi(ai/xi),
which represents the conditional probability of using action
ai ∈ Ai at state xi ∈ Xi. Corresponding to each stationary
policy and initial distribution βi of user i over the set of states
Xi , we obtain a probability distribution called occupation
measure zi(xi, ai) on the Cartesian set Xi ×Ai.
It is defined as,
zi(βi, ui;xi, ai) := lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
λziβi(xi[n] = xi, ai[n] = ai). .(3)
Under the assumption of unichain MDP, the occupation mea-
sure zi(βi, ui;xi, ai) is well defined for a stationary policy ui
and is independent of the initial distribution βi (Theorem. 4.1,
[17]) and is related to the corresponding stationary policy as,
zi(ai|xi) =
zi(xi, ai)∑
ai∈Ai
zi(xi, ai)
, ai ∈ Ai, xi∈ Xi. (4)
It can be verified that the above MDP is unichain. In this
work, we shall consider only the occupation measures, as the
stationary policy can be obtained from it using (4) and refer
to them interchangeably. Given policies zi, the average rate
obtained by user i is,
Ti(z) =
∑
xi,ai
R
z−i
i (xi, ai)zi(xi, ai), (5)
where the instantaneous rate R
z−i
i (xi, ai) of user i is defined
as,
Ri(xi, ai) =
∑
x−i
∑
a−i
( N∏
l=1
zj(xj , aj)
)
ti(x, a). (6)
Similarly, we define the average power and average queue
length under policy zi for user i respectively as,
Pi(zi) =
∑
xi,ai
pi· zi(xi, ai), Qi(zi) =
∑
xi,ai
qi· zi(xi, ai) (7)
Any policy zi which satisfies the user’s queue and transmit
power constraints is called a feasible policy. Hence, we define
the set of feasible policies Zi as,
Zi =
{
zi(xi, ai), xi ∈ Xi, ai ∈ Ai
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(xi,ai)
zi(xi, ai) = 1,
∑
(xi,ai)
[1yi(xi)− Pxiaiyi ]zi(xi, ai) = 0, ∀ yi ∈ Xi,
Pi(zi) ≤ P i, Qi(zi) ≤ Qi, (8)
zi(xi, ai) ≥ 0, ∀ (xi, ai) ∈ Xi ×Ai,
}
Each user selects a feasible policy to maximize his average
rate (5). Hence, we model this problem as a Non cooperative
Markov game. A feasible policy z∗i ∈ Zi of user i is called a
best response policy if,
Ti(z
∗
i , z−i)− Ti(zi, z−i) ≥ 0, ∀zi ∈ Zi. (9)
We represent the set of all such policies as Bi(z−i). This
Markov game is represented as the following tuple,
ΓN=
[
{N},{Xi}i∈N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{ti}i∈N ,{P i}i∈N ,{Qi}i∈N ,{Fi}i∈N
]
.
We define ǫ−Nash equilibrium for this game as follows,
Definition 1 (ǫ−Nash Equilibrium). A feasible policy z∗ ∈ Z
for all users is called an ǫ−Nash equilibrium (ǫ−NE) if for
each user i ∈ N and for any feasible policy vi ∈ Zi, we have
Ti(z
∗)− Ti(vi, z
∗
−i) ≥ −ǫ. (10)
Algorithm 1 Iterative Best Response Algorithm
1: Set iteration index k = 0
2: Initialize z(0) ∈ Z
3: Set ǫ > 0
4: while |z(k+1)−z(k)| ≥ ǫ and |T (z(k+1))−T (z(k))| ≥ ǫ
do
5: for j=1:N do
6: Set zj(k + 1) ∈ Bi(z−i(k))
7: k ← k + 1
8: return z(k) ⊲ The best responses are z(k) at stage k
A policy is called Nash equilibrium if ǫ = 0.
In the next section, we prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium and provide a iterative best response algorithm
to compute it.
IV. EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF NASH EQUILIBRIA.
The existence of Nash equilibria for this game has been
proved in [10]. We now propose a iterative best response
algorithm to compute an equilibrium policy.
A. Potential games
Definition 2 (Potential Games). A potential function Tˆ :
Z 7−→ R for the Markov game ΓN is a function which for
all users i ∈ N , any pair of policies (zi, zˆi) of user i and for
any multi-policy z−i of users other than user i satisfies,
Ti(zi, z−i)− Ti(zˆi, z−i) = Tˆ (zi, z−i)− Tˆ (zˆi, z−i). (11)
The next condition can be used to check whether game ΓN
has an potential function.
Theorem 3 (Potential Function). Suppose there exist a func-
tion t such that for any users i ∈ N , for all state-action pair
(x−i, a−i) other users and any pair of state action (xi, ai)
and (xˆi, aˆi) of user i the function ti(x, a) satisfies,
ti(xi, ai, x−i, a−i)− ti(xˆi, aˆi, x−i, a−i) = (12)
t(xi, ai, x−i, a−i)− t(xˆi, aˆi, x−i, a−i).
Then there exist a potential function for the Markov game Γ.
Furthermore, the function
Tˆ (z) =
∑
x∈X
∑
a∈A
[ N∏
l=1
zl(xl, al)
]
tˆ(x, a) (13)
is a potential function for the Markov game.
The next result shows that the Markov game ΓN has a
potential function.
Theorem 4. The game ΓN has a potential function.
Proof: Define the function t as,
t(x, a) , log2
(
1 +
∑N
j=1 hjpj · 1{qj>0}
N0
)
. (14)
The reader can verify the condition (12). The proof then
follows from theorem 3.
Using the latter results, we show that the iterative best
response algorithm (Algorithm1) will converge to an ǫ−Nash
equilibrium in finite iterations.
Theorem 5. 1) When the error approximation is ǫ = 0
and suppose the best response policy provided by the
best response algorithm at each stage is a vertex of
the polyhedron Zi, then the algorithm computes a Nash
equilibrium in finite number of iterations.
2) When the error approximation is ǫ > 0, the best response
algorithm computes an ǫ− NE in finite steps.
Proof: The proof is same as proof of theorem 3 in [18].
In general, though the number of Linear programs(LP)
required to compute the NE policies using the iterative
best response algorithm is less, in each such computation,
we need to calculate the objective function for the LP,
which quickly becomes computationally expensive. Indeed,
the order complexity of computing the objective function
is O
(
(2 ∗ (Qi + 1) ∗ (L + 1) ∗ (K + 1))
N−1
)
. Hence even
for moderate number of users, the Iterative best response
algorithm becomes unfeasible in practical amounts of time.
In the next section, we overcome this problem by introducing
the concept of an Infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium(IINE).
V. GAMES WITH LARGE NUMBER OF USERS.
We observe that as the number of the users tends to infinity,
the equilibrium policies of user become fixed. Indeed, the
equilibria policies eventually belong to a fixed set, which we
shall characterize in this section. To do so, we first give the
definition of an Infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium (IINE)
[9].
Definition 6. A policy z∗i of the i
′th user is referred to as an
Infinitely invariant Nash equilibrium (IINE) policy if for some
natural number N∗ and every finite subsets of users N ⊆ Z+
such that |N | ≥ N∗, the policy z∗i is a Nash equilibrium
policy for the game Γ , for all users i ∈ N .
The existence of an IINE, ensures that the equilibria policy
of each user remains same as long as the number of users
remains beyond the threshold N∗. In the next theorems, we
show the existence of an IINE under assumption of inter-
changeability of users [14], [15]. We first proceed by defining
sets which contain such policies. We define iteratively the set
of k′th sensitive policies as,
Ski = argmax
{
lki (zi)
∣∣ zi ∈ Ski, }, (15)
where the set S0i = Zi and the linear function
lki (zi) =
∑
xi,ai
(−1)k+1(hipi)
k · zi(xi, ai). (16)
We now define the set of infinitely sensitive policies Si of
user as
Si = ∩
∞
k=1S
k
i . (17)
From (15), we observe that
Ski ∈ S
k−1
i (18)
. Hence one can restate (17) as Si = limk→∞ S
k
i . In the next
theorem, we show that the set containing all the IINE policies
of user i is precisely the set Si.
Theorem 7 (Necessary and Sufficiency for existence of IINE
). Suppose the set Z+ of strictly positive integers can be par-
titioned into finite sets N1,N2, · · · ,Nk such that for all users
i and j of a set Nl, 1 ≤ l ≤ k, we have P i = P j ,Qi = Qj
Hi = Hj , Pi = Pj ,Qi = Qj and Fi = Fj . Furthermore,
assume there exist a policy zi ∈ Zi, such that l1i (zi) > 0, then
all the IINE policies of user i belong to the set Si. Conversely,
every policy of the set Si is an IINE policy.
The previous theorem shows that we can always show there
exist an IINE policy if we can show the set Si is non-empty.
We show this in the next theorem and also provide a finite
sequence of iterated Linear programs to compute one such
policy.
Theorem 8 (Existence of IINE). The set of infinitely sensitive
policies Si is nonempty. Furthermore, if we define M to be
the distinct number of elements in the set {hipi|hi ∈ Hi , pi ∈
Pi}, then Si = SMi .
Theorem (8) shows that rather than solving infinite linear
programs as given in condition (17), we need to only solve
for M (finite) number of linear programs. The integer M is
the maximum number of distinct values of the and ,SNR
random variable Xi which takes values the set {hipi|hi ∈
Hi, pi ∈ Pi}. The objective functions (16) are only functions
of the users states and actions and do not depend upon any
parameters of the other users. Hence these policies can be
precomputed by each user without knowing any information
from other users. When the number of users in the system
does cross the number N∗, these policies are indeed a Nash
equilibrium policies. Hence there is absolutely no need to use
the iterative best response algorithm. Indeed, at large number
of users, the complexity of computing the equilibrium policies
becomes linear.
Now, consider the scenario, where N ≥ N∗ and another
new player joins the system. The new user employs his IINE
policy, while the old users employ their previous IINE policies.
Again by the definition of IINE(6), these policies constitute
an equilibrium for the resulting game of N +1 players. Once
again, the use of IINE policies obtains significant reduction in
complexity. The next theorem shows that all the IINE policies
are interchangeable.
Theorem 9 (Interchangeability of IINE policies.). Let zi and
z∗i represent two distinct IINE policies for each user i. Then,
for each user i, Ti(z) = Ti(z
∗).Acknowledgment
The latter theorem indicates that the users can employ any
one of their IINE policies. Indeed, as there may exist multiple
IINE policies, however all are equivalent in the sense, that
they all provide the same reward to each user.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we validate our theoretical results using
simulations. We denote the largest power index and the largest
channel index by L and K respectively. The set of channel
states and power values for each user i is the same is equal to{
0, 1
K
, 2
K
, · · · , 1
}
and {0, 1, · · · , L}respectively. We consider
a Markov fading model with channel state transition proba-
bilities given by P (0/0) = 12 ,P (1/0) =
1
2 ,P (K − 1/K) =
1
2 ,P (K/K) =
1
2 and P (k − 1/k) =
1
2 ,P (k + 1/k) =
1
2 ,P (k/k) =
1
2 (1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1). The Noise variance for each
simulation is fixed to be 1.
The maximum number of admissible packets in the buffer
of every user is fixed to be Q. Hence the set of queue states
for each user i is {0, 1, · · · , Q} . The arrival distribution of
every user is Poisson with parameter λ. The Power and Queue
constraint for each user is the same and is denoted as Pˆ and
Qˆ respectively. For a fixed set of parameters (Scenarios), we
shall use the Best response algorithm (1) to compute a Nash
equilibrium policy for Nmax games. where the number of
players in the N ’th game (1 ≤ N ≤ Nmax) ,is N itself. We
fix Nmax = 4 for all scenarios.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Scenario K L Q Pˆ Qˆ λ M N∗
1 2 2 1 .50000 .500 .49 4 3
2 2 3 1 .95000 .500 .49 6 3
3 2 3 2 1.5500 1.00 .90 6 3
4 3 3 2 1.2800 .650 .60 7 3
5 3 3 3 2.1000 1.60 1.5 7 4
6 2 3 2 1.5500 .900 1.0 6 2
7 2 3 2 1.7000 .900 1.0 6 1
We list the parameters considered in the various scenarios
in Table I. The last two columns include the the number of
linear programs (M) required to compute the IINE policy and
the minimum number of users (N∗) at which the IINE policy
becomes an equilibrium policy. In Figure 1, we plot the l2
norm distance between the NE policies and the IINE policy
of user 1, as the number of users(N) varies from 1 to Nmax.
At each value of N , the best response algorithm is used to
compute a NE policy (z1(N)) of user 1 for each scenario.
Then in Figure (1), we plot ||z1(N)− z∗1 ||2 for each scenario
versusN , asN varies from 1 to Nmax. z
∗
1denotes the invariant
policy of user 1 and is calculated by solving a sequence of
linear programs as given in theorem (8). The l2norm between
two policies z1 and z
∗
1 is defined as
||z1(N)− z
∗
1 ||2 =
√∑
xi,ai
(z1 (x1, a1)− z∗i (x1, a1))
2
.
We observe from figure 1, that the NE policy of user 1, has
become equal to the IINE policy when the number of users
exceed N∗ as shown in table (I).
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
No. of Users (N)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
T
w
o
 N
o
rm
 D
if
fe
re
n
c
e
Figure 1
Scenario1
Scenario2
Scenario3
Scenario4
Scenario5
Scenario6
Scenario7
Fig. 1. Plot of the l2 norm distance between the NE policy and the IINE
policy of the first user against the total number of user as it varies from 1 to
Nmax.
Thus after N∗, there is no need to use the computationally
expensive Iterative best response algorithm, and rather we can
compute the IINE policy simply. The same result is enforced
in figure 2. Here we plot the absolute difference between the
time average rate of user 1, when all the N users use their
NE policies and the time average rate of user 1, when all
the N users use their IINE policies, against the number of
users N. That is, we plot |T1(z(N))− T1(z∗(N))| versus N ,
where z(N) = (z1(N), · · · zN(N)) represents the NE policies
of all the N users, when there are N players in the game and
z∗(N) = (z∗1(N), · · · z
∗
N(N)) represents the IINE polices of
the N users. Here also we can see that after the critical number
N ≥ N∗, the equilibrium reward(T1(z(N))) of user 1 is the
same as the reward(T1(z
∗(N))) when all the N users employ
their IINE policy. Indeed as in these scenarios, the NE polices
have become equal to the IINE policies as shown in figure 1,
the rewards then also become the same.
From table I, N∗ is 1 for secnario 7. This implies that the
IINE is a NE policy when total number of users exceeds 1.As
there have to be atleast one user, hence for this scenario, the
IINE is a optimal solution to the single user problem where
the user maximzies their own rate subject to power and queue
constraint. Futhermore as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2
this policy remains a NE policy for each user irrespective of
number of users in the system.
In Figure 3, we plot the absolute difference of One-sensitive
reawrds of user 1 computed at the Nash equilibrium policies
and the IINE policy of user 1 versus the number of users(N).
Recall that the One-sensitive reward when user 1 employs
policy z1 is
l11(z1) =
∑
xi,ai
hipi · zi(xi, ai). (19)
This is simply the time average SNR of user 1 at policy z1 and
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Figure2
Scenario1
Scenario2
Scenario3
Scenario4
Scenario5
Scenario6
Scenario7
Fig. 2. Plot of the absolute difference between the reward of user 1 when all
users use their NE policies and the reward of user 1 when all users use their
IINE policies against the total number of user as it varies from 1 to Nmax.
from 8, the IINE maximizes the time average SNR. In Figure
3, we plot |l1(z1(N))− l1(z∗)| versus the number of users N .
As observed in Figure 3, the NE policies maximize the One-
sensitive reward of user 1, once the number of users crosses
N∗. Indeed, as once the number of users cross N∗ the NE
policies are infinitely invariant and hence maximize the time
average SNR. Also in scenario 7, irrespective of number of
users, these policies always are One-sensitive optimal, as here
N∗ = 1.
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Fig. 3. Plot of the absolute difference between the One sensitive reward of
user 1 when user 1 employs its NE policy for the game with N users and the
One sensitive reward of user 1 when user 1 employs its IINE policy against
the total number of user as N varies from 1 to Nmax.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the scenario where multiple
transmitters can send atmost one packet to a single receiver
simultaneously over the multiple access channel. We model
this problem as a Constrained Markov game with independent
state information. That is, each user only knows his own
states and actions but only knows the statistics of the state
and actions of the other users. Each user selfishly maximized
their own rate by choosing a power and queue allocation
policy subject to power and queue constraints. We showed the
existence of Nash equilibrium in this setup and provided an
iterative best response algorithm to compute this equilibrium
for any number of users. We showed that under the assump-
tion of “finitely symmetric users”, there exists an infinitely
invariant Nash equilibrium; that is, when the total number of
users crosses a particular threshold (N∗), the Nash equilibrium
policies of each user remains the same. We then showed that
an IINE can be computed by solving a finte sequence of Linear
programs.
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Proof: We first observe that,
Ti(zi, z−i)− Ti(zˆi, z−i)
=1
∑
x−i,a−i
∏
l 6=i
zl(xl, al)
(∑
xi,ai
ti(xi, ai, x−i, a−i)
·
(
z(xi, ai)− zˆi(xi, ai)
))
=2
∑
x−i,a−i
∏
l 6=i
zl(xl, al) ·
[[ ∑
(xi,ai) 6=(xˆi,aˆi)
(ti(x−i, a−i, xi, ai)
(
z(xi, ai)− zˆi(xi, ai)
)]
+(ti(x−i, a−i, xˆi, aˆi)
(
z(xˆi, aˆi)− zˆi(xˆi, aˆi)
)]
=3
∑
x−i,a−i
∏
l 6=i
zl(xl, al) ·
[ ∑
(xi,ai) 6=(xˆi,aˆi)
(
ti(x−i, a−i, xi, ai)
−(ti(x−i, a−i, xˆi, aˆi)
)(
z(xi, ai)− zˆi(xi, ai)
)]
=4
∑
x−i,a−i
∏
l 6=i
zl(xl, al) ·
[ ∑
(xi,ai) 6=(xˆi,aˆi)
(
t(x−i, a−i, xi, ai)
−(t(x−i, a−i, xˆi, aˆi)
)(
z(xi, ai)− zˆi(xi, ai)
)]
=5T (zi, z−i)− T (zˆi, z−i).
The equality (5) in the above proof follows from reversing
the steps of the above result. Equality 3 follows from the
observation that
∑
xi,ai
zi(xi, ai) =
∑
xi,ai
zˆi(xi, ai).
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Before, we provide the proof of theorem (7), we give some
definition and notation which are used repeatedly. We use
Asymptotic notation, i.e, given two real valued functions,
f(n) and g(n)on the set of natural numbers, denote, f(n) =
o(g(n)), f(n) = O(g(n)) and f(n) = Θ(g(n)) whenever
there exist constants c1 and c2, both strictly greater than 0, and
a natural number N0 such that for all n ≥ N0, f(n) > c1g(n),
f(n) < c2g(n) or c1g(n) < f(n) < c2g(n) respectively. We
also denote
µ = inf
i≥0
E(Xi) andβ = sup
i≥0
E(Xi), (20)
where the random variable Xi is defined as,
Xi = hipiw.p
∑
qi,ci
z∗i (hi, pi, ci, qi), (21)
where z∗i is an IINE policy of user i. Note that, from
assumptions of Theorem (7), we show in Lemma (3) µ > 0
and β <∞. The following well known inequality is also used
heavily in our work. We mention it without proof.
Theorem 10 (Hoeffding’s Inequality ). We have for some
constant c > 0,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
∑N+1
j≥2 (Xj − E(Xj))
N
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ t
)
≤ 2 exp(−cNt2) (22)
We mention that certain Lemmas required in the proof of
theorem (7) are provided after the statement of the proof.
Proof of Theorem (7):
We first show that if z∗1 ∈ S1, then z
∗
1 is an IINE policy.
We have from Lemma (2), that l11(z
∗
1) > 0. Let z1 denote any
feasible policy of user 1 such that it is also a vertex/endpoint
of the polyhedron Zi and z1 /∈ S1. We shall prove that there
exist some positive number Nk1such that for all N ≥ Nk1 ,
T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1)− T1(z1, z
∗
−1) > 0.
(
T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1)− T1(z1, z
∗
−1)
)
(N)
k
=
∑
x1,a1
[
E
[
(N)
k
log2
(
1 +
h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)](
z∗1(x1, a1)
(23)
−z1(x1, a1)
)]
.
As z1 /∈ S1, there exist a positive integer k such that
z1 /∈ Sk1 . Let k represent the smallest such integer. Then
z∗1 ∈ S
m
1 , 1 ≤ m ≤ k − 1. Then using a Taylor series
expansion in the previous expression (23), we have for some
constant c,
T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1)− T1(z1, z
∗
−1)
=E

 (N)k(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k


[ ∑
x1,a1
(−1)k+1 (h1p11q1>0)
k
· (z∗1(x1, a1)− z1(x1, a1))
]
+ cE

 (N)k(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k+1


·
∑
x1,a1
(−1)k (h1p11q1>0)
k+1
(z∗1(x1, a1)− z1(x1, a1)) .
(24)
Using that z∗1 /∈ S
k
1 , z
∗
1 ∈ S
m
1 , 1 ≤ m ≤ k−1 and Lemma
(1), we have in (24), for some positive constant c1 > 0, and
some constant c2
T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1)− T1(z1, z
∗
−1) > c1 −
c2
N
.
Hence there exist a positive number N1such that for
all N ≥ N1, T1(z∗1 , z
∗
−1) − T1(z1,j, z
∗
−1) > 0. Let Nj
denote the positive number such that for all N ≥ Nj ,
T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1) − T1(zj , z
∗
−1) > 0, where z,j represents a ver-
tex/endpoint of the polyhedron Z1 and z,j /∈ S1. We claim
that T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1) − T1(z1, z
∗
−1) ≥ 0 for all z1 ∈ Z1 ,for
all N ≥ N∗ = maxj N1,j . Indeed, to verify (9), it suffices
to consider only the vertices of the polyhedron Z1 as the
optimization problem (9) is a Linear program. Clearly, we have
that for N ≥ N∗, T1(z∗1 , z
∗
−1) − T1(zj , z
∗
−1) > 0, where zj
represents a vertex/endpoint of the polyhedronZi and zj /∈ S1.
Now consider those points zˆ1, which belong to the set S1 and
are also vertex of the polyhedronZ1. Then we have, from (17),
lk1(z
∗
1) = l
k
1(zˆ1), for all k. Hence if we define the distribution
Pˆ (X1 = h1p1) =
∑
q1,c1
zˆ1(h1, p1, q1, c1),
then we see that the SNR random variable X1 has the same
moments according to the distributions P and Pˆ . Hence, by
method of moments, we have P = Pˆ . It can be shown now
that T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1) = T1(zˆ1,, z
∗
−1), for any N . In particular, this
implies that T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1) = T1(zˆ1,, z
∗
−1), for all N ≥ N
∗.
Hence, we have that T1(z
∗
1 , z
∗
−1) ≥ T1(z1,, z
∗
−1), for all for
all z1 ∈ Z1 and N ≥ N
∗, thus z∗1 is a IINE policy.
We now prove the converse. Let z∗1 denote an IINE policy
for user i, we shall prove that z∗1 ∈ S1 using induction. As z
∗
1
is an IINE policy, we have from definition (6) and (21) that
for any policy z1 ∈ Z1, for all N ≥ N∗,
∑
x1,a1
[
E
[
N log2
(
1 +
h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)](
z∗1(x1, a1)
(25)
−z1(x1, a1)
)]
≥ 0
At sufficiently large N , we have using a Taylor series
expansion, for some constant c > 0,
E
[
N log2
(
1 +
h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)]
=E
[
Nh1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
]
+ cE

N · O

 1(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)2




Using Lemma (1), the latter is,
= Θ(1)hipi1qi>0 +Θ
(
1
N
)
. (26)
Applying the latter bound (26) to get an upper bound for
(25), we have for some constants c1, c2, both strictly greater
than 0,
∑
xi,ai
c1h1p11q1>0 (z
∗
1(x1, a1)− z1(x1, a1)) +
c2
N
≥ 0.
Letting N →∞, we get that z∗i ∈ S
1
1 . We now assume that
the result is true till k − 1, i.e z∗1 ∈ S
m
1 , 1 ≤ m ≤ k − 1 we
show that z∗1 ∈ S
k
1 . We then have by Taylor series expansion,
E
[
Nk log2
(
1 +
h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)]
=cE

 k∑
l=1
−Nk
(
−h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)l
+cE

(N)k · O

 1(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)K+1




=cE

k−1∑
l=1
−Nk
(
−h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)l
+Θ(1)
(
(−1)k+1 hipi1qi>0
)k
+Θ
(
1
N
)
, (27)
where the last equality follows from Lemma (1). As z∗1 is
an IINE policy, we have from definition (6) and (21) that for
any policy z1 ∈ Z1, for all N ≥ N
∗,
∑
x1,a1
[
E
[
(N)
k
log2
(
1 +
h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)](
z∗1(x1, a1)
(28)
−z1(x1, a1)
)]
≥ 0.
Using (27) we get a upper bound for the latter (28),Hence
we have for some constants c1, c2, both strictly greater than
0,
∑
xi,ai
[
cE

k−1∑
l=1
−Nk
(
−h1p11q1>0∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)l(z∗1(x1, a1)
− z1(x1, a1)
)]
+
∑
xi,ai
c1
(
(−1)k+1 h1p11q1>0
)k
(z∗1(x1, a1)− z1(x1, a1))
(29)
+
c2
N
≥ 0.
As z∗i ∈ S
m
1 , 1 ≤ m ≤ k− 1, then from (18), the first term
in the above expression (29) is 0, hence (29) is,
=
∑
xi,ai
c1
(
(−1)k+1 h1p11q1>0
)k
(z∗1(x1, a1)− z1(x1, a1))
(30)
+
c2
N
≥ 0.
Letting N →∞, we get that z∗1 ∈ S
k
1 . Hence by induction,
z∗1 ∈ S1.
Lemma 1. We have, for each natural number k,
E

 1(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k

 = Θ
(
1
Nk
)
. (31)
E

 Nk(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k

 = Θ(1), (32)
Proof: We prove statement (31). Using Xj ≤ hkj p
l
J , we
have that ,
E

 1(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k

 = o
(
1
Nk
)
. (33)
To prove the other way, we have
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E

 1(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k


=E

1{∑N+1j≥2 Xj≥ 12Nµ} + 1∑N+1j≥2 Xj< 12Nµ(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k


≤
2k
(Nµ)k
+
1
Nko
P
(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj
N
< u/2
)
≤
2k
(Nµ)
k
+
1
Nko
exp
(
−c1Nµ
2
)
where the last inequality follows from Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity (22) . Hence,
E

 1(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k

 = O( 1
Nk
)
, (34)
and (31) follows from (33) and (34). We now prove state-
ment (32). Using the proof technique as carried out for (31),
we have,
1(
hkj p
l
J
)k <E

 Nk(∑N+1
j≥2 Xj +N0
)k

 <
(
2
µ
)k
+
(
N
N0
)k
exp
(
−c1Nµ
2
)
.
Hence we have (32).
In the next lemma we show that under the assumption
that the channel provides a positive reward for transmission
(π(hi = 0) < 1) and that there is always data to transmit
Fi(0) > 1, there always exists some policy zi such that
li(zi) > 0.
Lemma 2 (Feasible Policy). Assume Fi(0) > 1 and π(hi =
0) < 1. Consider the stationary policy ui for user i,
ui (pi, ci/hi, qi) =


1 ci = 0, pi = p
1
i , qi 6= 0, ∀hi ∈ Hi,
1− s ci = 0, pi = 0, qi = 0, ∀hi ∈ Hi,
s ci = 1, pi = 0, qi = 0, ∀hi ∈ Hi,
0 otherwise,
where p1i = inf {pi|pi > 0}. Given any value of Queue
constraint Qi and Power constraint P i, there exist some value
of s, under which both the constraints are satisfied. Also, under
the same value of s, we have l1i (zi) > 0.
Proof: Let zi represent the occupation measure cor-
responding to the stationary policy ui. Let zi(hi) =∑
qi,ai
zi(hi, qi, ai), zi(qi) =
∑
hi,ai
zi(hi, qi, ai) , zi(pi) =∑
xi,ai
zi(pi, ci, xi) and zi(hi, qi) =
∑
ai
zi(hi, qi, ai). It can
be easily verified under the policy ui, the fading process hi[n]
and the queue process qi[n] are independent. Also the queue
process qi[n] is ergodic with a single communicating class
consisting of the whole set Q. We denote π(hi),π(qi) and
π(hi, qi) as the stationary probability of being in channel state
hi, stationary probability of queue state qi and the joint station-
ary probability of state (qi, hi) . Then π(hi, qi) = π(hi)π(qi),
zi(hi) = π(hi), zi(qi) = π(qi) and zi(hi, qi) = π(hi, qi). The
transition probability of the queue process under the policy ui
is given by,
P (q2/q1) =


sFi(0) + 1− s q2 = 0, q1 = 0,
sFi(j) q2 = 0, q1 = j, 1 ≤ j ≤ Q− 1,∑∞
j=Q sFi(j) q2 = 0, q1 = Q,
1 q2 = j − 1, qi = j, 1 ≤ j ≤ Q,
0 otherwise.
Using the steady state equations, π = πP for the queue
process, we can show that,
π(k) = sπ(0)

1− k−1∑
j=0
Fi(j)

 ,
π(0) =
1
1 + sc
,
where c =
∑Q
k=1
(
1−
∑k−1
j=0 Fi(j)
)
≥ 0. Note that c = 0
if and only if Fi(0) = 1 and hence π(0) = 1 if and only if
Fi(0) = 1. The average queue length under the policy ui is,
Qi(zi) =
∑
xi,ai
qizi (xi, ai)
=
∑
qi 6=0
qiπ(qi)
=
s
1 + sc
Q∑
k=1



1− k−1∑
j=0
Fi(j)




≤
sQ
1 + sc
≤sQ. (35)
The average power expenditure under policy ui is,
Pi(zi) =
∑
xi,ai
pizi(xi, ai)
=
∑
qi 6=0
p1iπ(qi)
=
sp1i
1 + sc
Q∑
k=1



1− k−1∑
j=0
Fi(j)




≤
sQp1i
1 + sc
≤sQp1i .
Now by choosing 0 < s < min
{
Qi
Q
, Pi
Qp1
i
, 1
}
, we can
ensure that the average queue and power constraint will get
satisfied. We now compute l1i (zi) for the policy ui. Define
h1i = inf {hi|hi > 0}
l1i (zi) =
∑
xi,ai
hipizi(xi, ai)
≥h1i p
1
i

∑
qi 6=0
∑
hi 6=0
∑
pi 6=0
1∑
ci=0
zi(hi, qi, pi, ci)


=h1i p
1
i

∑
qi 6=0
∑
hi 6=0
∑
pi 6=0
zi(hi, qi, pi)

 . (36)
As user i, always transmit when his queue is not empty, we
have zi(hi, qi, pi = 0) = 0, for all qi 6= 0. Thus, we have in
(36) ,
l1i (zi) ≥ h
1
i p
1
i

∑
qi 6=0
∑
hi 6=0
∑
pi
zi(hi, qi, pi)


=h1i p
1
i

∑
qi 6=0
∑
hi 6=0
zi(hi, qi)


=h1i p
1
i (1− π(qi = 0)) (1− π(hi = 0)) .
Thus if we ensure π(qi = 0) < 1(or equivalently Fi(0) > 1)
and π(hi = 0) < 1, then l
1
i (zi) > 0.
Lemma 3. Let z∗i denote an IINE policy of user i and let the
random variable Xi be,
Xi = hipi w.p
∑
qi,ci
z∗i (hi, pi, ci, qi), (37)
Then
µ = inf
i≥0
E(Xi) > 0 andβ = sup
i≥0
E(Xi)¡∞. (38)
Proof: As the IINE policy is a NE policy, we shall prove
that l1i (zi) =
∑
xi,ai
hipizi(xi, ai) > 0 for any best response
policy zi. To do so, we first define the set of all best response
of user i as,
Bi =
⋃
N⊆Z+
⋃
z−i∈ZN−i
Bi(z−i), (39)
where ZN−i denotes the the set of all policies of users other
than i, when the set N containing the number i in the game
ΓN . Let C(Zi) denote the class of all the subsets of the set Zi,
which are obtained as convex closure of finitely many vertices
of the polyhedron Zi. As the vertices of the polyhedron Zi
is finite, we have the class C(Zi) itself as finite. We note that
the set Bi(z−i) contains all the best response policies of user
i, when users other than user i play multi-policy z−i. As this
set contains all the set of solutions of a linear program, we
have that this set is the convex closure of finitely many points,
each point being a vertex of the set Zi of feasible occupation
measures of user i. This implies that the best response set
Bi(z−i) belongs to the class C(Zi) for each multi-policy z−i
of users other than user i. As the class C(Zi) is finite, we have
that the set Bi is a finite union of compact sets. Hence Bi is
compact. As the IINE belongs to the set Bi, it suffices to show
that infzi∈Bi li(zi) > 0. As the set Biis compact, we simply
show that li(z
∗
i ) > 0 for any policy z
∗
i ∈ Bi. Let z
∗
i ∈ Bi be
any best response policy of user i for some game ΓN , when
the other users employ policy z−i. Let zi denote any arbitrary
policy of user i. Then we have that Ti(zi, z−i) > 0 if and
only if l1i (zi) > 0. By lemma (2), we have a policy z
1
i such
that l1i (z
1
i ) > 0, hence we have,Ti(z
∗
i , z−i) ≥ Ti(z
1
i , z−i) > 0.
Thus li(z
∗
i ) > 0 for the policy z
∗
i ∈ Bi. This shows that µ > 0.
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Proof of Theorem (8): We note that by assumptions
in Theorem (7), we have that Zi is non-empty, hence there
exist a point zi ∈ S
1
i . Hence by, statement (15), the sets
Ski are nonempty. By property (18), the set Si is non-empty.
Thus by theorem (7), there exist an IINE. We now show
that Si = Sk∗i , where M = #({hipi|hi ∈ Hi , pi ∈ Pi}).
Let zi and zˆi represent two distinct policies belonging to
the set Ski and Si respectively. Hence, we have that both
policies belong to Ski . We shall now show that zi ∈ Si.
Let Xi denote the SNR random variable which take values
in the set {hipi|hi ∈ Hi , pi ∈ Pi}. We order the set as
{x1, x2, · · · , xM}, with xi ≤ xi+1, x1 = 0 and xM = hki p
l
i.
Define two probability distributions, P and Pˆ such that,
Pˆ (X1 = h1p1) =
∑
q1,c1
zˆ1(h1, p1, q1, c1) and
P (X1 = h1p1) =
∑
q1,c1
z1(h1, p1, q1, c1). (40)
Let mk and mˆk represent the kth moments of the random
variable Xi with respect to the two distributions P and Pˆ .
As zi and zˆi represent two distinct policies belonging to
the set Ski , we have mk = mˆk, ∀ 1 ≤ k ≤ M. If we
define a matrix V of size (M − 1 × M − 1) with entries
Vk,l = (xk)
l
, 2 ≤ l ≤ M − 1, 2 ≤ k ≤ M − 1,
then we have V (yˆ − y) = 0, where the M − 1 vectors
are defined as zˆ =
(
Pˆ (x2), Pˆ (x3), · · · , Pˆ (xM )
)
and z =
(P (x2), P (x3), · · · , P (xM )) respectively. However, as V is
an invertible matrix, we have yˆ = y and hence Pˆ = P. Now
as the distributions are the same, this implies that the moments
mk and mˆk are the same for all k. As l
k
i (zi) = (−1)
k+1
mk
and lki (zˆi) = (−1)
k+1 mˆk, we have that zi ∈ Si and hence
Ski ∈ Si.
Proof of Theorem (9): Let zi and zˆi represent two IINE
policies for each user i. Define two probability distributions
P and Pˆ as in (40). We can now show by a computation that
for each set N
Ti(zi, z−i) = E
[
log2
(
1 +
Xi
N0 +
∑
j 6=iXj
)]
,
where the Xi are SNR random variables which takes
values in the set {hipi|hi ∈ Hi , pi ∈ Pi} . As zi and zˆi are
both IINE policies for user i, by using a similar argument
as done in the proof of Theorem (8), we have that , and
hence Ti(zi, z−i) = Ti(zˆi, zˆ−i). Thus the IINE policies are
interchangeable.
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